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During the socialist era the communist regime attempted to reduce development 
differentials among states and social classes. In contrast, during the last 20 years, the 
economies in transition experienced considerable divergence in the economic, social, 
demographic and political areas. As a result, these countries can now be grouped into 
four structurally different clusters alternatively dependent on manufactured exports, 
high- and low-tech services, commodities exports, and migrant remittances. Between 
2000 and 2007, the cluster with the fastest growth was not that which most reformed its 
economy and institutions, but that of commodity exporters where, however, life 
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1  Introduction: transition and divergence in Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union  
The countries in transition which have emerged from the socialist bloc of Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union (EE-FSU)1 have always been very different. Their 
heterogeneity has distant origins and finds its roots in dissimilar endowments of natural 
resources, geographies and cultural developments over several centuries. Yet, during the 
socialist era public policy explicitly attempted to reduce differentials in levels of 
development among states, regions within states, and social classes. Such an 
‘equalization of outcomes’ agenda was pursued by compressing the wage distribution, 
socializing the profits of state-owned enterprises, subsidizing key consumption items, 
and providing universal pensions, family benefits, and free de jure (if not de facto) 
health and education.2 In turn, cross-country differences were reduced by the use of 
‘socialist prices’ (often equal to one tenth of world prices) in trade among the socialist 
economies, generous transfers from the USSR budget to poorer Soviet republics (equal, 
for instance, to a third of Uzbekistan’s GDP in 1991), and the funding of major 
infrastructural projects directly from Moscow. The development pattern was also very 
similar. While differences in natural endowments affected somewhat the division of 
labour among the socialist economies (by emphasizing, for instance, manufacturing in 
Central Europe, oil extraction in Siberia and cotton cultivation in Central Asia), 
everywhere the emphasis was placed on industry, large enterprises (kombinati), and 
science and technology.  
 
The evidence about convergence in economic and social outcomes during the socialist 
era points to a complex picture. In a study covering 1945-95, Cornia and Danziger 
(1997) find a clear convergence in infant mortality rates (IMR) across socialist countries 
between 1950 and 1970 and a more limited one in the subsequent years. Convergence in 
levels of life expectancy at birth (LEB) was achieved in the region till the late 1960s, 
after which the rate of improvement diminished sharply and the speed of convergence 
declined. Considerable convergence in the quantity (if not in the quality) of schooling 
was also observed. In the economic field there was a strong similarity in the growth 
rates of the Net Material Product till the end of the 1970s, as all countries grew at 
planned rates of 4-5 per cent. By definition, however, convergence in growth rates was 
not accompanied by convergence in the levels of NMP per capita. During the last 
decade of the socialist experiment the situation was reversed as there was divergence in 
NMP growth rates, as the richer Central European countries (Hungary, Czechoslovakia 
and Poland) grew more slowly than the poorer states of the USSR. This trend suggests 
that some convergence in NMP/c was achieved during this period. However, a study 
                                                 
1 The 25 countries analyzed include: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, 
Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, 
and Uzbekistan. Lack of data did not allow including Bosnia I Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro. All 
regional or cluster averages are unweighted.  
2 Access to goods and services varied across regions, particularly in the FSU, as the urban areas and 
towns along the main rail lines were better covered than remote towns and rural areas. Also, access to 
health and higher education often entailed the payment of ‘voluntary contributions’ that discriminated 
against the poor and less well connected.    2
testing for a common growth path in the ex-communist bloc (Estrin et al. 2001) finds 
little evidence of convergence in NMP per capita within the bloc, a result which 
questions the effectiveness of policies to reduce differentials during the socialist era.  
 
Since the onset of the transition, public policy has been inspired by the liberal ideology 
which attributes a central role to the market in the allocation of resources and limits the 
state intervention in the economy. Such new policy approach promoted price and trade 
liberalization, the dismantling of within- and cross-country equalization mechanisms 
inherited from the socialist era, the adoption of wage policies emphasizing human 
capital, merit and effort, decentralization, and a shift in welfare policy from the 
principle of ‘equalizing outcomes’ to that of ‘equalizing opportunities’.  
 
Despite a common emphasis on price liberalization, privatization of housing and small 
businesses, re-orientation of foreign trade and so on, and similar changes in economic 
structure (de-agrarization, dismantling of heavy industry, development of services), in 
the initial phase of the transition, policy approaches differed markedly across countries. 
Some nations relied on a shock therapy (as in Poland), others opted for a gradual 
approach, while post-soviet countries (such as Belarus and Turkmenistan) introduced 
hardly any reform. Thus, the transition represents a large-scale natural experiment, 
similar in extent and impact only to the decolonization of the 1950s, in which 
differences in initial conditions, policy approaches, institutional development and 
external financing lead to vastly different economic and social outcomes. Indeed, output 
and social conditions deteriorated only up to 1991 in Poland, 1995-96 in most countries, 
and 1999 in Moldova and Ukraine. While these differences affected the level of output 
and wellbeing, they did not, however, lead to a visible differentiation in economic 
structures. In contrast, with a region-wide recovery which started around 2000, the 
economic structure of the countries in transition began to diverge. The transition has 
therefore led to a double differentiation among countries sharing similar initial 
conditions, the first in the ‘rate of growth’ (over 1989-99) and the second in the ‘pattern 
of growth’ (over 2000-07). A final issue explored in this study is whether the 
differentiation in the pattern of growth affected aggregate growth and social 
performance. 
2  Evidence of divergence among EE-FSU countries: 1989-2007 
2.1  Increasingly similar approaches to the transition since mid-to-late 1990s 
In the initial years, the approaches to the transition differed substantially. Most countries 
of Central Europe and the Baltic (Poland ahead of all) opted for a shock therapy, 
stabilized rapidly their macroeconomy and liberalized swiftly domestic markets and 
external transactions. In contrast, other countries (such as Uzbekistan) staggered their 
economic reforms over several years. As a result, till the mid 1990s, the increase in the 
mean regional value of the EBRD ‘overall reform index’ was accompanied by an 
increase in its coefficient of variation (CV) standard deviation (SD)3 (Table 1). Since 
                                                 
3 The measures used here to test σ-divergence are the standard deviation, i.e. the square root of the sum 
of the differences between the values of a variable and its regional mean, divided by the number of 
country observations at time t, i.e.: SD = √1/n Σ (xi –μ)
2 (where the first symbol on the RHS is the square 
root). When the values of xi change considerably up-or down-ward over time, comparisons based on SD 
are biased. In this case it better to use the coefficient of variation CV = SD/μ which is equal to a   3
then, the countries which had initially adopted a gradual approach intensified their 
reform efforts, leading in this way to a gradual convergence in reform approaches—as 
indicated by the fall of the CV of this variable since 1995. Thus, with the exception of 
‘post-soviet’ Belarus and Turkmenistan and ‘gradualist’ Uzbekistan, from the middle-
late 1990s most countries of the region appear to have adopted similar economic 
policies. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the distribution of the EBRD ‘overall economic reform 
index’  
Year  number of 
countries  mean median  Min  Max  SD  CV 
1989  25  1.13 1.00 1.00 1.78 0.27 0.24 
  1990  25  1.24 1.00 1.00 2.62 0.46 0.37 
1995  25  2.80 2.83 1.40 3.72 0.58 0.21 
2000  25  3.12 3.27 1.57 3.87 0.60 0.19 
2005  25  3.29 3.43 1.45 3.98 0.64 0.19 
2007  25  3.32 3.48 1.45 4.05 0.64 0.19 
Source: author’s elaboration on EBRD data. The overall reform index varies between 1 (no reform) and 5 
(full reform).  
 
2.2  Macroeconomic stabilization: initial cross-country divergence followed by 
convergence  
The effect of gradual convergence in reform approaches alluded to above are 
particularly evident in the field of macroeconomics. While macro outcomes differed 
substantially in the early phase of the transition (with most Central European and Baltic 
economies recording better results than the countries of South Eastern Europe and the 
CIS), over the medium term performance in this area has slowly converged, as the 
laggards gradually improved their indicators since the mid 1990s, possibly as a result of 
the emphasis placed by governments and IMF on stabilization and of the requirements 
to be fulfilled by countries aspiring to enter the EU. As a result, as shown in Table 2, the 
average budget deficit/GDP, government debt/GDP, and inflation declined steadily 
since 1995.4 Only the mean current account deficit/GDP (as well as its minimum and 
maximum values) rose in 2007 because of the surge in the world prices of food and fuel 
which affected unfavorably the importing countries of the region. Table 2 suggest also 
that there was considerable convergence in budget deficits/GDP, debt/GDP and 
inflation. Only the current account/GDP shows an ambiguous trend during the last few 
years, as its mean, min and max values rose, while the SD rose. However, the CV rose 
between 1995 and 2000, but broadly fell since then. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
standardized SD. While CV is preferable in most cases, it utility declines when the mean (μ) tends to 
zero, a fact which raises markedly its value. In this case it is better to use the SD.  
4 The data for 1990 refer to a small number of countries and cannot be compared with those of the 
following years.   4
Table 2: 1990-2007 descriptive statistics of the cross country distribution of 
macroeconomic indicators  
Variable Year  number  of 
countries 
Mean Median Min Max SD CV







1990 9  -2.03 -1.10 -8.15 3.10 4.01  1.97
1995 25  -4.75 -3.84 -17.30 0.40 4.34 0.91
2000 25  -3.22 -2.95 -12.27 3.20 3.62 1.13
2005 25  -0.69 -1.23 -7.82 8.10 3.38  4.93






    
1990 1  95.10 95.10 95.10 95.10 ….. …..
1995 21  36.26 20.51 7.36 118.74 33.45 0.92
2000 24  47.68 44.02 4.70 122.27 31.25 0.66
2005 24  31.90 32.63 4.52 85.94 19.06 0.60






    
1990 6  -2.4 -2.3 -8.3 1.9 4.0  1.67
1995 25  -5.8 -4.2 -18.3 2.2 6.3  1.10
2000 25  -2.6 -3.7 -14.6 18.0 6.2  2.37
2005 25  -3.0 -2.6 -12.4 13.6 6.8  2.29






    
1990 6  129 26 -0.2 585 228  1.77
1995 25  183 39 2.0 1005 263  1.43
2000 25  18 9 -0.8 168 33  1.77
2005 25  6 6. 0.5 13 4  0.65
2007 25  7 7 1.9 16 4  0.55
Notes: *as the mean of General government deficit/GDP tends to zero, its cross-country variability has to 
be assessed on the basis of the SD (see footnote 4). 
Source: author’s elaboration on IMF-GFS data.   
2.3: Economic performance: cross-country divergence followed by hysteresis  
Despite increasingly similar policy approaches adopted since the mid late 1990s and the 
convergence observed for most indicators of stabilization, the economic performance of 
EE-FSU countries diverged sharply in the initial part of the transition (roughly 1989-95 
or 1989-99),5 as the transformational recession affected less severely the Eastern 
European countries and Uzbekistan than those of the FSU. During this period the 
GDP/c, its annual growth rate, the investment rate and the Gini index of income 
inequality deteriorated sharply but at different speeds and for different durations, 
causing in this way a clear divergence in economic performance, as indicated by the 
increase in the CV of these four variables during the initial years of the transition 
(Figure 1).  
                                                 
5 In Eastern Europe, the duration of the transformational recession that began in 1989 varied from a 
minimum of two years in Poland, to three to four in most of the rest, and between eight and ten years in 
Bulgaria and Romania, where an initial recovery was derailed by a currency crisis and other shocks. In 
the countries of the FSU the transformational recession started mostly in 1990 (except for Latvia, 
Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan where it began in 1991), while the recession generally ended 
in 1996-98, though the Baltic and Caucasus countries, Belarus and Uzbekistan returned to growth in 
1993-95. In contrast, Moldova and Ukraine bottomed out only in 1999.    5
Figure 1: 1989-2007 trend in the coefficient of variation of GDP/C, its growth rate, the 
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Source: author’s elaboration on WDI data. Note: the sharp rise of  the CV of the growth rate of GDP/c is 
due to the fact that its 1995 regional mean was close to zero (-0.2). Yet, an increase in its dispersion is 
confirmed also by the SD which rose from 5 to 7.2 between 1990 and 1995, to decline to 4.0 in 2000.   
 
There is a huge literature on the factors explaining the differences in the extent and 
duration of the transformational recession. The initial analyses suggested that countries 
which adopted a shock therapy and quickly liberalized domestic and external 
transactions performed better than those following a gradual reform path. This view was 
best summarized in the 1996 World Development Report which noted that ‘Consistent 
policies, combining liberalization of markets, trade and new business entry with 
reasonable price stability, can achieve a great deal even in countries lacking clear 
property rights and strong market institutions’ (World Bank 1996: 142). .      
 
Yet, subsequent analyses (Roland 2000; Cornia and Popov 2001; Popov 2005) 
emphasized the role of initial distortions, wars, the collapse of state institutions, and the 
supply shocks entailed by too rapid changes in relative prices following price 
liberalization in highly distorted economies.6 Indeed, a large share of the variation in the 
extent of output collapse appears to be explained by the magnitude of the distortions in 
industrial structure and trade patterns inherited from the socialist era, i.e. by the weight 
of the military sector, extent of over-industrialization, underdevelopment of the service 
sector, under-openness of the economy, and share of exports to socialist countries. This 
                                                 
6 There are several explanations of why a gradual transition may lead to a better performance than a 
shock therapy; see Roland (2000) for a survey. These explanations emphasize among others: the 
weakening of the state and its inability to enforce production quotas under the system of dual pricing; the 
absence of competitive product markets due to the monopolistic nature of privatized SOEs; the 
‘disorganization’ entailed by the disruption of the supplier-producer and producer-retailer linkages 
inherited from the socialist era, and the high costs or rebuilding these linkages (Blanchard and Kremer 
1997). In turn, Popov (2005) argues that with rapid price liberalization, the ability to reallocate resources 
from the ‘non-competitive sector’ (i.e. that with the highest price distortions during socialism) to the 
‘competitive sector’ is limited by the low saving and investment capacity of the country, as a rapid 
contraction of former sector reduces the overall output, saving and investment capacity of the country. 
The upper limit to the speed of reallocating resources from non-competitive to competitive industries is 
thus basically determined by the net investment/GDP ratio.    6
explanation emphasizes the difficulties caused by market imperfections (such as limited 
capital and labour mobility, and poorly develop banking and housing market) in 
restructuring the supply-side of the economy and reallocating labour from the declining 
to the competitive sector during a period of depressed investments. The divergence in 
growth rates was due also to differences in institutional capacity of the state, i.e. its 
ability to collect taxes to fund ‘a minimum state’ capable of ensuring law and order, 
protection of property rights, contract enforcement, basic social services and so on.  
 
Since the late 1990s, the entire region experienced a considerable growth rebound 
which lasted till the onset of the food–fuel–financial crisis of 2007-09. Such rebound 
was driven by factors other than those that influenced performance during the transition, 
and can thus be analyzed with the usual tools of conventional growth theory. Indeed, it 
could be expected that several years of economic liberalization lead to efficiency gains 
and a better economic performance, while the impact of pre-transition distortions faded 
away, institutional capacity improved and macroeconomic policy remained reasonable. 
During this period, all countries of the region recorded, with rare exceptions, fast rates 
of growth. As a result there was considerable ‘σ-convergence’ (i.e., in growth rates) but 
not, as predicted by most growth models, ‘β-convergence’ (i.e., in levels of GDP/c). In 
this case, the available evidence suggests the presence of hysteresis as the relative and 
absolute difference in GDP/c declined only modestly from the peak reached between 
1995 and 2000. In many countries, the recovery recorded since the late 1990s was to an 
important extent a ‘growth rebound’ which made use of unused capacity rather than of 
an increase in the capital stock, as suggested by the only limited convergence in 
investment rates (Figure 1). In other words, investments recovered in some countries but 
not in others, and their cross country distribution remained in mid-late 2000s more 
polarized than in the early-mid 1990s (ibid.). Similar considerations apply to the Gini 
coefficient of the distribution of net household income per capita, which rose by about 
ten points during the first decade of transition, to stabilize since then at the same level, 
while its CV declined only in part.     
 
It must be emphasized that while in the 2000s the recovery involved the entire region, 
its drivers started to increasingly differ across countries. Thus, contrary to the fairly 
uniform approach followed during the era of central planning, economic liberalization 
has lead to a diversification in economic structures (see section 3).  
2.4 Demographic changes and long-term growth  
Long-term growth in the economies in transition will be influenced also by the future 
labour supply (which depends on birth, death, and migration rates) and population 
ageing, as measured by the old age dependency rate. As many economies of the region 
are at the moment net exporters of labour, or as those which have a net immigration 
balance (such as Russia) will be unable to solve their population problem by further 
increasing immigration, long-term growth will increasingly depend on trends in births 
and deaths. In this regard, Table 3 shows that until 1995 the decline in fertility rate 
affected only part of the region (as shown by the increase in the CV). The drop in 
fertility spread subsequently to all other countries (as shown by the decline in the CV). 
During the last 3-4 years the fertility rate has climbed imperceptibly in several 
countries. Yet the birth losses recorded between 1989 and 2005 will reduce labour 
supply over the next 15 years and beyond in the entire region, with the exception of 
Central Asia. In part of the region, the initial phase of the transition was also   7
characterized by a surge in male mortality rates (especially for the 25-39 age group), 
while starting from 1995 it slowly returned to the 1989 level (Table 3). Yet, as indicated 
by the rapid rise in the CV and SD, adult mortality in the region increasingly diverged, 
as several countries of the FSU (such as Russia, Ukraine, Belarus) continued exhibiting 
abnormally high adult mortality rates while the Eastern European countries showed 
steady improvements. Such countries will thus be affected by further decreases of their 
working age population. Finally, with the exception of the countries of Central Asia, 
most economies in transition (particularly the Eastern European ones) recorded a rise in 
average old age dependency ratio and in its cross-country variance (ibid). 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of the cross country distribution of key demographic 
indicators, 1990-2007  
Variable   Year  Number of 
countries Mean Median Min Max SD CV








  1989 18 2.27 2.04 1.52 4.18 0.72 0.32
  1990 25 2.42 2.04 1.46 5.09 0.91 0.38
  1995 25 1.96 1.58 1.23 4.52 0.88 0.45
  2000 25 1.70 1.39 1.10 4.00 0.68 0.40
  2005 25 1.66 1.42 1.20 3.53 0.58 0.35
  2007 25 1.70 1.42 1.20 3.35 0.55 0.32
      







  1989 25 188 193 98 264  47 0.25
  1990 25 193 189 104 276  50 0.26
  1995 25 239 213 105 484  105 0.44
  2000 25 201 177 90 457  100 0.50
  2005 25 198 148 77 514  120 0.60
  2007 …. …. …. …. ….  …. ….








  1989 25 21.8 24.2 11.4 30.9  6.6 0.30
  1990 25 22.3 24.6 11.5 31.7  6.7 0.30
  1995 25 23.6 26.6 10.7 34.7  7.3 0.31
  2000 25 24.7 27.9 10.4 34.7  8.1 0.33
  2005 25 24.7 25.8 9.1 35.9  8.9 0.36
  2007 25 24.4 26.4 8.5 36.8  9.2 0.38
Source: author’s elaboration on Transmonee data. 
2.5 Divergence  and  hysteresis in human wellbeing 
It is well known that the transition entailed deterioration in several aspects of human 
wellbeing, particularly during the years of the transformational recession. Yet, since the 
mid-late 1990s, the regional life expectancy at birth (LEB) and other social indicators 
recorded a clear rebound. However, such improvements resulted from two mutually 
offsetting trends; i.e., gains recorded in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus and losses or 
continued stagnation in the rest of CIS. As a result, the CV of LEB and the mortality 
rate of the 15-19 years old shows a steady divergence during the first years of transition 
followed by hysteresis or further divergence in the subsequent years (Figure 2). In 
contrast, an initial cross-country divergence followed by hysteresis is evident in the case 
of IMR, enrolment rates in tertiary education, and overall crime rate. All in all, Figure 2 
points to a systematic divergence over 1989-2007 in all the aspects of human wellbeing   8
considered, with large rises in the cross-country dispersion of several indicators of 
wellbeing during the transformational recession, followed by further divergence or 
hysteresis during the growth years of the last decade. Such trend is contrary to what is 
suggested by economic theory in countries experiencing rapid growth, and runs contrary 
the trends observed between 1950-89.  
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Source: author’s elaboration on Transmonee data. 
2.6  Divergence in political structures 
Many indexes are used to measure the extent of democracy. They all suffer from 
measurement bias but offer some information on the evolution of political systems in 
the countries considered. The indicator selected in this study is ‘the rule of law index’ 
which ranges between -2.5 (no rule of law) and 2.5 (complete rule of law) and is 
available from 1996 onward. In this regard, the data in Table 4 show a slow 
improvement in such index for the region as a whole between 1996 and 2007. But it 
shows also a steady increase in its CV from 2000 to 2007, suggesting that after a 
generalized improvement in the rule of law, political institutions in the region started to 
diverge. The Central European countries built strong democratic regimes characterized 
by fair and free elections and a ‘just society’ characterized by the rule of law and state 
institutions able to collect taxes, ensure property rights, enforce contracts and take 
responsibility for the universal provision of basic social services. A second group of 
countries (some of the states of the FSU and the Balkan) evolved into ‘illiberal 
democracies’ (Zakaria 1997) i.e. regimes characterized by only partially free and fair 
elections, limited rule of law, scant protection of individual rights, a weak 
administration unable to ensure the respect of property rights, contracts enforcement and 
a modicum of social welfare. Finally, Central Asia and Belarus can be characterized as 
authoritarian regimes lacking fair and free elections, with no rule of law and the   9
frequent recourse to authoritarian measures by the executive. Given the emphasis placed 
by the literature on the importance of democracy, rule of law and state institutions for 
economic and social development, the above data suggest that the divergence in 
political institutions observed since 2000 might have affected negatively investment 
climate, output and human wellbeing in part of the EE-FSU. 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics of the cross country distribution of the rule of law index, 
1996 2007  
year 
Number of 
countries  Mean Median Min  Max  SD    CV 
1996 25 -0.24  -0.21  -1.23  0.87  0.65  2.68 
2000 25 -0.36  -0.60  -1.40  1.00  0.75  2.10 
2005 25 -0.30  -0.50  -1.40  0.81  0.72  2.43 
2007 25 -0.27  -0.50  -1.28  1.00  0.72  2.63 
Source: author’s elaboration on Worldwide Governance Indicators. 
2.7 Summing  up 
The prior analysis has argued that the EBRD overall policy reform index diverged in the 
years of the transformational recession but converged in the subsequent period, meaning 
that the policy approaches to the transition became increasingly similar. However, 
despite this, during the growth years of 2000-07 there was a limited reconvergence for 
most of the 13 economic and social indicators included in Table 5, as in 11 cases there 
was either hysteresis of further divergence. 
Table 5: Summary of the changes in regional mean and dispersion of key performance 
indicators, 1989-2007  
 Transformational  recession  1989/90-2000 
(or 1989/90-95) 
Years of recovery 
(late 2000-2007) 
  trend in regional mean  trend in cv   trend in regional mean  trend in cv  
GDP/c   Decline 2479Æ 1917 (1995)  Divergence  Increase  1917 Æ 3639   Hysteresis 
Growth rate GDP/c   Decline 0.8 Æ- 0.2 (1995)  Divergence   Increase  -0.2 Æ 8.6  Convergence 
Investment/GDP Decline  32.3Æ   22.6  Divergence   Increase  22.6 Æ 28.9  Hysteresis  
Gini of disp. Income  Increase 23.6 Æ  32.4   Divergence   Increase  32.4Æ 33.1  Hysteresis 
TFR Decline    2.42  Æ 1.70   Divergence  Constant  1.70 Æ 1.67   Convergence 
Death rate 25-39  Increase 188Æ239 (1995)  Divergence   Decline   239 Æ 198  Divergence  
Old age dependency 
ratio (60+/(15-59) 
Increase  21.8 Æ 24.7  Divergence   Constant 24.7 Æ 24.4  Divergence  
LEB   Decline 70.4 Æ 68.7 (1995)  Divergence   Increase 68.7 Æ 71.2  Hysteresis 
IMR Decline  33  Æ 24  Divergence   Decline  24 Æ 17  Hysteresis 
Death rate 15-19  Increase 77 Æ 85 (1995)  Divergence   Decline  85 Æ 59  Divergence  
Enrolment in tertiary 
education  
Increase 18 Æ 31  Divergence  …..  ….. 
Overall crime rate  Increase 851 Æ 1590  Divergence   Increase 1590 Æ 1769  Divergence  
Rule of law  Decline- 0.24 (1996)Æ-0.36  Convergence  Increase  -0.36Æ- 0.27  Divergence 
Source: author’s compilation on the basis of the data reported in the prior tables and figures. 
 
This increasing regional heterogeneity does not deny that club-convergence might have 
taken place within homogeneous clusters (see next section). For instance, Matkowski 
and Prochniak (2006) found β-convergence over both 1993-99 and 1999-2005 among 
the EU Accession Countries (five Central European and three Baltic). The convergence 
was particularly marked during the latter period. According to these authors, this was 
the result not only of decreasing return to capital in richer economies but also of 
structural and regional policy introduced by the EU to reduce the development gap in   10
the region. Yet, while club-convergence might have occurred in some cases, the general 
picture is one of a widespread process of divergence within the region. 
3  Structural change and the birth of structurally different country clusters    
3.1  Broad trends in structural changes in the region 
With systemic changes in asset ownership, price formation, allocation of resources and 
external economic relationships, all transition economies experienced radical structural 
changes. Gone was the emphasis on state agriculture, forced industrialization, heavy 
industry, large kombinati, limited labour mobility and uniform approaches to 
development. Five major structural changes were observed in all countries, regardless of 
their initial level of income,7 factors endowment and geographical location. The first 
was ‘de-agrarization’ (Landesmann 2000), i.e. a decline in the share of agricultural 
value added and employment to levels similar to or lower than those of market 
economies with similar GDP/c (Table 6). It must be noted, however, that over 1991-93 
Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Romania, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, i.e. all countries with a low GDP per capita, experienced 
a process of ‘re-agrarization’, as agricultural output declined less markedly than 
manufacturing and labour moved from urban to rural areas in countries which carried 
out egalitarian land reforms. This phenomenon was however transitory and the 
temporary shelter offered by agriculture was abandoned when service sector jobs 
became available and people had the opportunity to migrate. As a result, since the mid 
1990s agricultural output and employment dropped also in low-income countries in 
transition, as well as in countries such as Moldova, Ukraine, Russia and Kazakhstan 
which count on a strong comparative advantage in agriculture.  
 
The second common structural transformation was ‘deindustrialization’. All industrial 
branches, particularly manufacturing and energy generation suffered an absolute fall in 
the employment and output level, particularly in countries where the ‘initial distortions’ 
(a high share of employment and output in heavy industry and the armament sector) was 
greatest. Here too there were exceptions to the general rule, particularly in countries of 
group 3 (Table 6) where the share of manufacturing value added remained broadly 
constant or even rose. Indeed, after a minor drop over 1989-92, the output and 
employment share of manufacturing remained constant in Hungary, Slovenia and the 
Czech Republic while it rose in Slovakia which has become a major production 
platform for multinationals operating in the automotive and other sectors. These 
economies have also shown important structural changes in the field of foreign trade as 
suggested by the type of goods exported, countries of destination, and export/GDP 
ratios.8 This sub-group appears to have dwelled on its old expertise in manufacturing 
production. In contrast, in the rest of group 3, the share of manufacturing declined 
sharply, for instance from 23 to 16 per cent in Estonia and from 28 to 11 per cent in 
Latvia. 
 
                                                 
7 In 1989 GDP/c (2000 prices), varied from US$500 in Tajikistan to around US$8,000 in Slovenia. 
8 Over 1989-2007, export/GDP ratios rose respectively from 45 to 80% in the Czech Republic, 36 to 80 
in Hungary, 20 to 40 in Poland and a staggering 28 to 86 in Slovakia.    11
Table 6: Changes in selected structural economic indicators over 1991/2-2006   
















1. 8 countries 
with a 1989 
GDP/c < 1250 $ 
(2000 prices)   
1991/2 32.5  26.3  4.7  16.4    1560 
1995 35.2  18.8  6.8  17.2  1242 
2000 27.2  15.4  8.2  20.7  1201 
2006 21.9  13.7  9.0  20.3  1320 
 
2. 8 countries 
with a 1989 
GDP/c > 1250 
and < 3000 $ 
(2000 prices)   
1991/2  21.9  25.5    7.3  20.6  3221 
1995 18.0  20.2  10.0  23.2  2518 
2000 13.2  19.7  11.9  26.2  2266 
2006   9.8  18.4  11.6  30.2 2661 
 
3. 9 countries 
with a 1989 
GDP/c > 3000 $ 
(2000 prices)   
1991/2  8.5  26.6    9.7  29.9  2884 
1995  7.6  22.6    9.5  34.2  2721 
2000 5.3  21.4  10.3  37.0 2660 
2006 4.4  20.6  10.3  37.5 3006 
Note: *The three groups include the following countries: group 1: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan; group 2: Belarus, Bulgaria, Georgia, 
Kazakhstan, Makedonia, Romania, Russia, Ukraine; group 3: Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia. 
Source: author’s elaboration on UNCTAD’s data.  
 
 
The third structural change—related to the decline of the heavy industry and change in 
the relative price of energy—is a substantial decline in energy consumption per capita 
(Table 6) which fell by roughly a third in group 1 and 2 and a tenth in group 3. While 
this fall was expected during the first years of transition, it then lasted also during the 
subsequent years, though a modest trend reversal took place in 2006. Fourth, in all 
economies in transition there was a substantial expansion of services. This catching-up 
was, however, partially due to statistical reclassifications and outsourcing of service 
activities previously undertaken within the industrial sectors (Landesmann 2000). The 
sub-sector which caught up most rapidly was ‘transport and telecommunication’ which 
saw its share of GDP reach 9-12 per cent (Table 6). An additional observation concerns 
the rapid growth (especially among countries of group 3) of ‘other services’ which 
includes banks and other financial institutions, real estate, business services (such as 
accounting, legal, software, consulting), personal services (private health, nursing, 
entertainment, and so on) and tourism. This was true in particular in countries lacking 
an established manufacturing tradition, such as the Baltic countries and South Eastern 
European. Particularly in these countries, the employment and output gains in ‘other 
services’ almost completely compensated for the employment and output losses in 
industry and agriculture. These countries generally specialized in the modern branches 
of the ‘other services’ sector, though in some cases they developed service activities 
with a low value-added.   
 
Finally, the liberalization of the labour market led to a substantial transfer of labour 
across sectors, informal employment, fast job turn-over and—with the liberalization of 
labour movements and a reduction in work opportunities during the 1990s—mass 
migration first towards Russia and subsequently towards the EU. In some of group 1 
countries, labour migration reached substantial proportions. Though the literature 
suggests that migration does not lead to long-term growth (IMF 2005)—including 
because of the low fertility rates of some of the countries from which it originates (e.g.   12
Moldova and Ukraine)—in several EE-FSU countries migrant remittances have become 
a major source of subsistence and short-term growth. The latest figures (that 
underestimate their true value) show in fact that in 2006-07 migrant remittances 
accounted for between 13 and 25 per cent of GDP in Albania, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and 
Moldova, and for a staggering 36 per cent in Tajikistan.           
3.2 Cluster  analysis   
As suggested by the above descriptive analysis, different patterns of specialization 
emerged in the region during the last decade. Particularly during the recovery and 
growth phase of late the 1990s to 2007, there was substantial structural diversification 
within the region, a trend opposite to the forced convergence observed during the 
socialist era. Thus, though all EE-FSU countries recorded during this period a growth of 
GDP of 5-10 per cent, the drivers of such growth differed remarkably. To identify the 
clusters of economies which have emerged in the region since the onset of the 
transition, and especially since 2000, a hierarchical cluster analysis was carried out for 
1996 (the first year with complete data), 2000 (mid way into the transition) and 20069 
(the last year with complete data) using four scale-unstandardized clustering variables 
little correlated with each others, i.e.: (a) ‘net manufacturing exports/GDP’ which 
identifies the economies characterized by a dominant manufacturing sector; (b) ‘share 
of ‘other services’/GDP’ which identifies economies which developed an advanced or 
informal services sector;10 (c) ‘net exports of fuels and ores/GDP’ which characterizes 
those economies whose main growth engine is the export of primary commodities; (d) 
the ‘sum of Official Development Assistance (ODA) and migrant remittances on GDP’. 
As noted, in the initial phase of the transition some of the poorest countries relied in a 
major way on ODA while from the end of the 1990s increased labour mobility raised 
substantially their share of migrant remittances on GDP.  
 
The analysis identified in 2006 four country groups with dissimilar factor endowments, 
institutions, and growth drivers (Table 7). The first includes some Central European 
nations (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, and Slovakia) plus Belarus and 
Ukraine, i.e. countries dependent on the export of manufactured goods, supported in 
most cases by large inflows of FDI and foreign finance. The second includes mixed and 
predominantly tertiarized economies (the three Baltic, Bulgaria, Romania, Macedonia 
and Georgia) is somewhat more heterogeneous. The third cluster is constituted by 
primary commodities exporters (Russia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan). 
Cluster 4 (Albania, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan) includes 
nations initially dependent on foreign aid and which later become suppliers of migrants, 
becoming in this way dependent for their growth on the inflows of remittances.11  
                                                 
9 To reduce noise, the 1996 value of the variables is set equal to the average of 1995 (where available), 
1996 and 1997, that of 2000 to the average of 1999, 2000 and 2001, and that of 2006 to the average of 
2005 and 2006.  
10  See section 3.1. 
11 In a few cases, the official value of migrant remittances was corrected on the basis of information 
available to the author. In Armenia most migrant remittances are recorded as FDI, as part of this money is 
used to purchase houses. To correct for this bias, half of the value of FDI was treated as migrant 
remittances. A similar approach was followed in Georgia and Ukraine. Likewise, the 2006/07 value of 
remittances in Uzbekistan was estimated at 10 per cent of GDP on the basis of unofficial data 
communicated to the author in 2008 by the local Chamber of Commerce. In Uzbekistan the rate of   13
Table 7: Descriptive statistics of clustering variables for four groups of economies in 
transition, 2006 
 Net  exports  of 










Cluster 1: exporters of 
manufactured goods   
Bel, Czech, Hun, Pol, 
Slov, Slvk, Ukr. 
Minimum -7.9  0.6  -2.2  26.6 
Mean   -4.7  1.6  2.3  35.4 
Maximum   -1.3  3.3  7.3  45.3 




Bul, Cro, Est, Geo 
Lat, Lit, Rom, Mak 
Minimum -8.8  1.8  -20.8  28.8 
Mean   -3.5  5.1  -16.2  34.2 
Maximum   4.1  9.1  -10.1  40.0 
CV 1.0  0.6  0.3  0.1 
 
Cluster 3: Oil-ores 
exporters  
Azer, Kaz, Rus, Tkm 
Minimum 21.1  -3.3  -27.0  10.4 
Mean   34.1  0.5  -17.1  23.1 
Maximum   54.4  4.3  -4.5  28.7 





Alb, Arm, Kyrg, Mold, 
Tjk, Uzb  
Minimum -17.5  9.0  -33.6  15.1 
Mean   -2.7  19.5  -18.2  21.1 
Maximum   5.9  35.8  -10.6  32.3 
CV 
3.2 0.5  0.5  0.3 
 
Entire region (25 
countries) 
Minimum -17.5  -3.3  -33.6  10.4 
Mean   2.4  6.8  -11.7  29.6 
Maximum   54.4  35.8  7.3  45.3 
CV 6.7  1.3  0.9  0.3 
Source: author’s calculation on official data.  
 
The country groups are unambiguously identified in the case of clusters 1, 3 and 4, as 
the minimum, mean and maximum of the relevant clustering variables differ 
substantially from those of the other  groups while their CV is lower than those of the 
entire region and of the other groups. The only partial exception is cluster 2 (mixed 
tertiarized economies). While its CV is lower than that of the other groups, its mean is 
similar to that of cluster 1. This implies that this group is identified on the basis of more 
than one clustering variable. The attribution of the 25 countries to the four clusters 
seems in most cases in line with what is known about these economies. However, there 
were a few surprises. For instance, despite the correction mentioned in footnote 11, data 
problems may have influenced the assignment of Georgia to the cluster of mixed-
tertiarized economies rather than to that of aid-remittances dependent countries.  
 
The analysis shows also that—always using the same clustering criteria—the 
composition of the clusters changed over time following shifts in economic 
specialization. Table 8 shows in fact that in1996, i.e. 4-7 years after the onset of the 
transition, the ‘industrial-manufacturing model’ inherited from the socialist era was still 
dominant in 15 of 25 countries analyzed. With the recovery which began in mid 1990s, 
the growth bonanza of the 2000-07 period, and the rise in world commodity prices, 
                                                                                                                                               
outmigration rose exponentially in the aftermath of the land reform of 2004-07 which expelled two 
million peasants from privatized shirkats. Finally, in countries with no data on remittances but which are 
known to have low rates of migration (e.g., the oil producers, Czech Republic and Slovakia) this variable 
was assigned the value of 0.1%.   
12 This value is artificially high as the mean tends to zero. In all these cases the CV is of little use.   14
there was however, an increasing divergence in growth patterns. As a result, seven 
countries (identified with one or two stars in Table 8) changed cluster between 1996 and 
2000 as a result of a shift away from the manufacturing and mixed economies clusters, 
while 11 countries changed cluster between 2000 and 2006. Only nine countries on a 
total of 25 retained in 2006 their initial economic specialization. This number would 
drop further if considering that of these nine Armenia and Kyrgyzstan relied almost 
entirely in the initial years of the transition on foreign aid and less on migrant 
remittances, while the opposite occurred during the 2000s. Summing up, Table 8 
confirms that there were many changes in economic specialization, away from the 
uniform socialist pattern of heavy industrialization and towards more diversified 
patterns of growth.     
Table 8: Evolution over time of four clusters of 25 European countries in transition: 
1996, 2000, 2006 
  1996 2000 2006 
Cluster 1: manufactures 
exporting economies 
BEL, BUL, CZE, EST, 
HRV, HUN, LIT, LVA, 
MDA, MKD, POL, ROM, 
SVK, SVN, UKR  
BUL, CZE, EST, HRV, 
HUN, LIT, LVA, MKD, 
POL, ROM, SVK, SVN, 
BEL**, CZE, HUN, 
POL, SVK, SVN, 
UKR** 
 
Cluster 2: mixed or 
tertiarized economies 
AZE, KAZ, RUS, UZB,  BEL*, UKR*  BUL*, EST*, GEO**, 
HRV*, LIT*, LVA*, 
MKD*, ROM*,  
Cluster 3: oil-ores 
exporting economies  
TKM AZE*, KAZ*, TKM, 
RUS*, TJK** 
AZE, KAZ, TKM, RUS, 
Cluster 4: remittances 
and aid dependent 
economies 
ALB, ARM,GEO, KGZ, 
TJK 
ALB, ARM,GEO, KGZ, 
MDA*, UZB* 
ALB, ARM, KGZ, 
MDA, TJK*, UZB 
Note: *indicates the shift over time to a cluster with a lower average GDP/c; **a shift to a cluster with 
higher GDP/c. 
Source: author’s calculations on official data.  
4  Economic and social performance by cluster over 2000-07  
Sections 2 and 3 have shown that the transition led to a marked divergence among the 
countries of EE-FSU in practically all economic and social fields, and that, with 
domestic and external liberalization, these countries become increasingly 
heterogeneous. These four clusters differ not only in terms of economic structures and 
engines of growth, but also in terms of the economic and social indicators listed in 
Table 5. Cluster 1 (manufacturing exporters) displays the best indicators in practically 
all areas: it has the highest GDP/c, lowest inequality, highest public spending (a 
possible proxy of institutional strength), best rule of law, highest LEB, and lowest 
mortality rates, old age dependency ratio and crime rates. Strangely enough, however, it 
has also the lowest growth rate of GDP over 2000-07 and the second lowest investment 
rate. In turn, cluster 3 (fuel-ores exporters) has the worst indicators in practically all 
areas but the highest investment and GDP growth rates. In view of all this, this section 
tests formally whether belonging to a given cluster affects economic performance 
(measured by the growth rate of GDP/c) and social performance (measured by LEB).     15
4.1  Country clusters and growth of GDP/c  
Despite their limited progress in terms of economic and institutional reforms, and 
contrary to the expectations of most analysts (Åslund and Jenish 2006), from 2000 to 
2007 the CIS countries (coinciding with clusters 3 and 4) recorded a faster growth than 
those of Eastern Europe (cluster 1). How can this growth paradox be explained? Why 
did growth lag behind in the fast reformers? More generally, what explains the growth 
performance of the countries of the region since 2000?   
 
To answer this question, an ‘eclectic growth regression’ was estimated including among 
the explanatory variables four sets of factors: (a) the stock of production factors 
(broadly understood), i.e. the physical capital (computed by means of the permanent 
inventory method, i.e. summing up the investment/GDP ratios over the previous 8 years, 
and assuming an amortization rate of 12.5 per cent), public expenditure/GDP (a proxy 
of the stock of available public goods or, alternatively, a measure of labour supply 
disincentives) and the rule of law (a proxy of the stock of ‘institutional capital’);13 (b) 
the initial level of development of each country (measured by the GDP/c of 1990-93). 
As suggested by Solow’s unconditional convergence, countries with an initial lower 
level of development grow ceteris paribus faster than more advanced ones. This means 
that the countries of clusters 3 and 4 are expected ex ante to grow faster than those of 
cluster 1. However, Solow’s unconditional convergence is expected to occur over the 
long-term (while the period analyzed here covers only eight years), suggesting ex-ante 
that this variable might be non significant; (c) since the period analyzed was preceded 
by a catastrophic, if varying, decline in GDP/c, a ‘growth rebound effect’ was also 
included among the regressors using as a proxy of this phenomenon the growth rate 
recorded during the difficult years of 1990-93. Thus, a possible explanation of the 
variation in growth rates over 2000-07 might be simply that GDP rebounded faster in 
the FSU countries which had recorded a much larger output contraction in the earlier 
part of the transition and could therefore count on greater unused capacity; (d) the 
diverging economic specialization of each country. Thus, four dummies variables were 
introduced, each of them identifying the four clusters identified in section 3. The 
dummies take value 1 if a country belongs to a given cluster and zero otherwise. This 
allows to test whether—in addition to growth factors, growth convergence, and growth 
rebound—the new economic specializations affected growth over 2000-07.  
 
The regression was carried out on a panel of 25 countries and 8 years (from 2000 to 
2007), for a total number of 200 observations, though lack of some data for some 
countries/years reduced the size of the panel to 168-193 observations, depending on the 
model tested (Table 9). The Haussmann test indicates that the random effect (RE) 
estimation procedure is the most suitable for this dataset, as this procedure is consistent 
with the use of time-invariant variables such as the average GDP/c over 1990-93, and 
the growth rate of GDP/c over the same period.  
 
The results of model 1 (as well as 4, 5, 7 and 8, i.e., five specifications out of nine) 
suggest that there is a β-convergence, as poorer countries grow faster than the richer 
ones. Second, the ‘growth rebound’ effect is successfully tested in five specifications 
out of the eight in which such variable appears, though this is effect is always verified at 
                                                 
13 The stock of human capital was not included as this variable shows little variation across the countries 
of the region.   16
a probability level of only 12-18 per cent. As for the standard growth variables the 
results show that: first, the proxy of the capital stock is always strongly significant 
(except in model 9 where the investment rate is interacted with the cluster dummies). 
Second, the government expenditure/GDP ratio is always significantly and negatively 
associated with the growth of GDP, suggesting that the disincentives effect of high 
taxation associated to high public expenditure prevails on the positive effects of public 
goods on growth. The parameters suggest that a rise of ten points in public 
expenditure/GDP reduced the rate of growth by 0.9-1.0 per cent. This may suggest not 
so much a negative effect of providing public goods (infrastructure, health, education) 
but rather the ‘crowding out’ effect that large income transfers may have on investment. 
This is only a mere supposition, and more detailed tests are needed to confirm it. Third, 
the parameter of the variable ‘rule of law’ is almost never significant, possibly because 
measurement errors do not permit it to proxy this phenomenon adequately.   
 
Fourth and final, the introduction of cluster dummies (models 4 to 8) suggests that 
belonging to the cluster of oil-ores exporters raised in a statistically significant way the 
rate of growth of GDP/c by between 2.1 and 4.6 per cent a year in relation to the pivot 
cluster of the manufacturing exporters. This is a large effect which is at odds, however, 
with the theoretical literature which suggests that ‘Dutch disease’ and distributive 
distortions tend to reduce the long-term growth of commodity exporters. This result 
likely reflects the high world prices of metals and energy over 2000-07. 
 
The results in Table 9 also show that belonging to the clusters of ‘tertiarized-mixed 
economies’ and ‘aid-remittances recipient economies’ worsen the rate of growth of 
GDP/c in relation to the group of ‘manufacturing exporters’, though this effects is small 
(0.5 to 2.9 per cent for the first group, and 0.3 to 1.5 per cent for the second, depending 
on the regression model considered) and statistically non significant. All in all, it 
appears that,after controlling for the usual growth factors, β-convergence, and growth 
rebound effects, divergence in economic specialization among originally fairly similar 
countries did affect growth performance over the medium term. The longer term effects 
are, however, not so clear as countries endowed with abundant natural resources rarely 
experience faster growth than countries with other types of specialization (Sachs and 
Warner 1997). 
   17
Table 9: RE-GLS regression results (dependent variable: growth rate of GDP/capita) 2000-07   
   Regressors    Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8    Model 9 
Constant  .0861** .0590*  .0173  .0347  .0177 .0989 .0770** .0231  .1790* 
















2. G.r. GDP/c 1990-3        -.1795*^^ -.0731  -.1141*^^  -.1566** -.1810*  -.2316***  -.1050 -.1043 
3. Σ Investment/GDP (t-8)-t         .0007***   .0006*** .0006***  ………  ……..  .0006***  -.0004 
4. Gov expenditure/GDP              -.0010** -.0009*  ………. -.0009* ……..  -.0009* -.0010** 
5.  Rule of law (+)      -.0004   .0071  ………  …….  .0196*  ………. .0047 
6. Dummy Manufactures 
exp.  
     Pivot  Pivot  Pivot Pivot Pivot Pivot 
7. Dummy Mixed 
economies 
   -.0093  -.0032  -.0116  -.0154  -.0052  -.1524** 
8. Dummy Fuel-ores 
exporters   
     .0218   .0312**   .0285*^^  .0467**   .0204  -.2108*** 
9. Dummy Recipients aid-
rem.   
   -.0164  -.0052  -.0295*^  -.0215 -.0135 -.1246* 
15.Dummy7  * invest/GDP                  .0010** 
16. Dummy8 * invest/GDP                  .0017*** 
17.Dummy 9 * invest/GDP                   .0007*^^ 
               
R2  .084 .164 .364 .435  .408 .328 .370 .409 .481 
N. of observations    193  193  168  168  192  193  169  192  168 
N. countries in panel  25  25  24  24  24  25  25  24  24 
Notes: ***, **, *, *^, *^^ indicates that the parameters are not significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, 10%, 14%, and 18% probability level.  
Source: author’s calculations.   18
4.2 Country clusters and changes in LEB 
A second test was carried out to ascertain whether the divergence in economic 
specialization observed since 2000 affected human wellbeing, proxied here by LEB. As, 
ceteris paribus, GDP/c affects favorably LEB in middle income economies, one would 
expect that the oil-ores exporters performed better also in this area during the last 
decade. The opposite should be true for the countries of the clusters of mixed-teritarized 
economies and aid-remittances dependent countries, as the parameters of their dummies 
(Table 9) suggested that belonging to these groups had a negative effect on the growth 
of GDP/c.  
 
To test these hypotheses a ‘basic LEB regression’ was carried out including several of 
the standard regressors, i.e. log GDP/c, year-to-year changes in the level of the Gini 
coefficient of the distribution of household income, public health expenditure/GDP, 
enrolment rates in secondary education14 (a proxy of the human capital and health 
knowledge of the families), and child dependency ratio (which is expected to affect 
negatively LEB). In addition, the four cluster  dummies mentioned above were also 
introduced, while, as an alternative, the dummies were replaced by the yearly values of 
the clustering variables, i.e. net exports of manufactured products/GDP (CLV1), the 
share of ‘other services on GDP’ (CLV2), net exports of fuel and ores/GDP (CLV3), 
and aid plus inward remittances/GDP (CLV4).  These variables allow to test whether 
belonging to a given cluster improves or worsens the LEB of a country, suggesting in 
this way whether, ceteris paribus, the recent shifts in economic specialization affected 
its health status.       
 
The regression results in Table 10 confirm the positive and statistically significant 
relation between LEB and log GDP/c. They also suggest a weakly significant but 
important negative relation between LEB and rises in the Gini coefficient of income 
inequality. In turn, public health expenditure/GDP affects favorably LEB in the basic 
model, but becomes statistically non significant when introducing the cluster dummies 
(models 2 to 5) or the clustering variables CLV1 to CLV4 (model 6). The enrolment 
rate in upper secondary education does not appear significant, possibly for the reasons 
given in footnote 14, while the child dependency ratio has the expected negative sign 
(models 4 and 5) but is not significantly different from zero, and becomes inexplicably 
positive and significant in model 6, contrary to ex-ante expectations. 
 
The above variables were mainly introduced as controls, and the main objective of the 
test was to assess the impact of diverging economic specialization on LEB, which is 
used in this study as an overall proxy of human wellbeing. In this regard, the results of 
Table 10 show unambiguously that, despite a better growth performance, belonging to 
the cluster of oil-ores exporters entails a cost in terms of lower LEB of 4.2-4.6 years in 
relation to the pivot cluster of manufacturing exports. In turn, belonging to the cluster of 
                                                 
14 The appropriate variable to proxy the level of education and health knowledge of households should be 
the level of education of adult women, but this variable was not readily available. However, as the stock 
of education in the region is distributed very equally, improvements in health scores are evident only for 
those who completed tertiary education. This information, however, is readily available in the 
Transmonee database only until 2005 and, furthermore, these data suffer from comparability problems. 
This is why it was decided to use instead data on upper-secondary enrolments.    19
the mixed economies entails no change in LEB in relation to the pivot cluster, while 
belonging to that of aid and remittances dependent countries entails a statistically non 
significant but positive advantage of 0.5-1.3 years. Finally, the regression using the 
yearly values of the clustering variables (CLV) instead of the cluster dummies (model 
6) broadly confirms the results just mentioned, i.e. that the oil-ores exporters 
experienced over 2000-7 a significant disadvantage in LEB, that the manufacturing 
exporters experienced in contrast a positive advantage, with no significant effects for 
the other two clusters.  
Table 10: RE-GLS regression results, dependent variable: LEB, 2000-07  
Regressor  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
         
Constant  53.7***    54.4***  56.1*** 56.3*** 56.1*** 50.0*** 
1. Log GDP/c     2.01***   2.11***  2.12***  2.10***   2.09***  2.24*** 
2. Δ Gini  2000-7   -.0587*^^ -.0595*^^  -.0590*^^  -.0589*^^ -.0579*^^ -.0680*^^ 
3. Public health Exp/GDP    .485*^^  .0654  ….. ….. .0100  .441 
4. Enrolm. rate in upper 2ary   …….  -.0167  …..  -0.124  -.0059 
5. Child dependency ratio     …….  …….  -0.332  -.0159  .0739** 
6. DummyC1 (manuf export)     Pivot  Pivot  Pivot  Pivot  ….. 
7. DummyC2(mixed econ)    .0654  -0.063  -.0386  .0468  ….. 
8. DummyC3  (oil-ores exp)     -4.63*** -4.59*** -4.61*** -4.19**  ….. 
9. DummyC4  (aid+remittan)      1.067 .578  1.317 1.171 ….. 
10. CV 1 (manuf exp)/GDP            .0264* 
11. CV 2 (mixed econ )/GDP            .0119 
12. CV 3 (oil-ores exp)/GDP            -.0297* 
13. CV 4 (aid –remitt )/GDP            .0020 
         
R2 0.560  0.796  0.793 0.782 0.791 0.642 
N. of obs.   135  134  134     134   134  134 
Number of countries in panel  25  24  24       24  24  24 
Notes: ***, **, *, *^, *^^ indicates that the parameters are not significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, 
10%, 14%, and 18% probability level.  
Source: author’s calculations. 
5 Concluding  remarks 
This study has argued that—contrary to the trends observed during the 45 years of 
socialist rule (or at least of the first 30)—transitional recession and economic and 
political liberalization in the EE-FSU have lead to a marked cross-country divergence in 
practically all economic, social and political dimensions. Limited re-convergence or 
hysteresis was instead observed during the years of the widespread recovery of the 
2000s. As a result, the countries of the region constitute now a far more heterogeneous 
group than twenty years ago. The study has also shown that with the internal and 
external liberalization of the last twenty years, four main country clusters have emerged, 
with similar economic structures and growth drivers within each clusters, but with 
major differences across clusters. Subsequent regression analysis points to unexpected   20
results. Indeed, after controlling for a host or relevant factors, the cluster with the fastest 
growth is not the one which recorded the fastest progress in reforming its institutions or 
with the lowest initial GDP/c but that of oil-ores exporters. This trend has been 
observed, however, over a relatively short period of time, while economic theory 
suggests that primary commodity exporters generally grow more slowly over the long 
term than other types of economies. In addition, the better economic performance of this 
cluster was accompanied by a statistically loss of over four years of LEB in relation to 
the countries specialized in the export of manufactured goods.  
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